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The Limits of Coercion in Bilateral Bargaining Situations: The Case of the American-Israeli Dyad

ABRAHAM BEN-ZVI

This work examines four case studies, from 1975 to 1983, in which pressure was exerted by the United States on Israel. The central finding that emerges is that all the American administrations involved found it exceedingly difficult to break away from certain well-defined parameters that severely restricted their freedom of action in pursuing a coercive policy toward Israel.

INTRODUCTION

Various facets of American-Israeli relations have in recent years become the subject of heated scholarly and journalistic debate. Yet we have still to see a systematic survey of the major factors that determine the success of pressure exerted by the superpower to influence its client's behavior.

This analysis will attempt to bridge this gap, and thus to shed light on at least some of the inherent, structural constraints under which the United States sought, during the past decade, to influence Israel's priorities, values, and risk calculations. In so

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This article is a condensed and updated version of, and at the same time an elaboration of certain ideas contained in, a monograph originally prepared under the auspices of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University.

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doing we shall employ several conceptual notions from the fields of bargaining and crisis theory. More specifically, we shall try to show that even in the absence of the military option, certain recurrent types of international interaction that are patterned on the basic premises of crisis theory can be identified in an essentially cooperative context defined by Holsti as "consensual" (Holsti 1977, p. 179; Brecher 1978, p. 6; Lauren 1979, pp. 198–200). Indeed, if one proceeds beyond the accepted dichotomy between crisis and noncrisis, one is bound to discover a wide cluster of crisis determinants even though the basic structure of the bargaining situation does not correspond to what is generally defined as a pure and unmitigated international crisis (Jervis 1979, p. 294; Lauren 1979, p. 199; Maoz 1982, p. 217). A coercive bargaining process of asserting firmness, making threats and warnings, and exerting pressure in various ways to influence the other party to accept one's will (Snyder and Diesing 1977, p. 195) can therefore occasionally unfold in an essentially accommodative environment where some, at least, of the background images, values, and goals of the parties are identical.

Here we shall focus on the role these conflictual and coercive ingredients play within the relatively benign context of a specific dyad, which is characterized by the convergence of "many important common interests between the sides" (Holsti 1977, p. 179; Jervis 1979, p. 294). In applying several, albeit not all, of the analytical components of crisis to the American-Israeli framework, we seek to show that influence in a consensual type of relationship can be exercised not only by techniques of accommodation and persuasion, or through the subtle offering of rewards, but by more assertive and forceful strategies as well. We hope that this recognition will help eliminate at least some of the crude and simplistic dichotomies and generalities that still abound in the literature, and will thus pave the way toward a more comprehensive, multifaceted, and context-dependent theory of bargaining and influence in international politics (George and Smoke 1974, pp. 510–512).

In addition to this search for linkages between the seemingly irreconcilable notions of alliance politics and crisis bargaining, the analysis of the structural limits of coercive diplomacy in a given consensual dyad should yield greater insight into the nature of American-Israeli relations and the prospects of future American coercive measures.

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The concepts that will serve as our principal analytical tools (although in a revised form that takes into account the specific nature of the American-Israeli dyad) are deterrence and coercion. These are the two basic, complementary dimensions that must be integrated into any systematic strategy which seeks to influence behavior. As we shall soon see, it was the premises of these bargaining techniques, as modified according to the special features of this bilateral setting, that constituted part of the conceptual infrastructure for the architects of American Middle East policy in their recurrent efforts to influence Israel's behavior.

Unlike the strategy of deterrence, which seeks to convince an opponent not to *initiate* any harmful actions at all (Schelling 1966, pp. 78–79), coercion deals with action that is taking place or already has (George, Hall, and Simons 1971, p. 24; Lauren 1979, p. 192). To effectively pursue a posture based upon the premises of bargaining theory, the initiator of these complementary strategies must create in the mind of the belligerent the expectation of costs that are grave enough to influence his will and thus erode his motivation to persist. However, the closer to the belligerent's core values and interests the challenger moves, the firmer the belligerent will hold onto his initial posture (George, Hall, and Simons 1971, pp. 26–27; Snyder and Diesing 1977, p. 244; Jervis 1979, p. 306; Lauren 1979, p. 193). On these occasions, one can expect defiant, recalcitrant behavior to persist even in the face of strong pressures (Lebow 1984, pp. 182, 185), so that the coerced party will manifest greater resolve than the coercing (or deterring) party.

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In addition to its need to influence the adversary's value structure, a successful coercive or deterrence strategy depends upon an optimal mix, or trade-off, between threats and positive inducements. Such a combination may significantly encourage a settlement by reducing the opponent's disinclination to comply with what is demanded of him (George, Hall, and Simons 1971, pp. 25–26; Snyder and Diesing 1977, p. 207; Jervis 1979, p. 305). Coercive diplomacy in any given situation "may be facilitated by genuine concessions to an opponent as part of a quid pro quo that secures one's essential demands" (George, Hall, and Simons 1971, p. 25).

We present here four case studies in which American policy makers attempted to implement a systematic posture of pressure based on the premises of either deterrence or coercion. These cases are: (1) the reassessment of American policy toward Israel in the spring of 1975; (2) the joint superpower statement on the Middle East of 1 October 1977; (3) the Reagan administration's decision of June-July 1981 to suspend delivery of four F-6 fighter-bombers to Israel in the wake of the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the Israeli air raid on PLO headquarters in Beirut; and (4) the punitive measures taken by the same administration during and in the wake of the Lebanon War of 1982. The focus will be on the patterns of deterrence and coercive diplomacy the Americans used, the efficacy of these efforts, and the inherent and recurrent constraints the Americans encountered.

THE LIMITS OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY IN THE US-ISRAEL DYAD: AN OVERVIEW

During the last decade, two sets of factors converged to severely constrain America's margin of maneuverability toward several small allies, including Israel. The first set reflects the general nature of the contemporary international system. As Keohane points out, the emergence of a loose, yet highly competitive, bipolar nuclear system has presented new opportunities for small powers. The competition for allies on the one hand, and the constraints imposed on the superpowers by the balance of terror on the other, have enabled small allies to acquire a degree of influence "out of proportion to their size" (Keohane 1971, p. 162). Indeed, under the threatening shadow of the nuclear umbrella and the pervasive fear of a direct superpower confrontation, the small allies frequently enjoy a wide latitude of choice while the nominally strong powers find it very difficult to translate some of their power resources into effective influence (Keohane 1971, p. 162; Baldwin 1979, pp. 164–167; Bar-Siman-Tov 1980, pp. 203, 207).

The American efforts to influence Israel were further constrained by more specific factors involving what is usually referred to as the "special relationship" between the United States and Israel. As such, they reflect "a widespread fund of goodwill toward Israel that is not restricted to the Jewish community," and an equally strong and persistent commitment to Israel's continued national existence, integrity, and security (Reich 1977, p. 365; Safran 1978, p. 572).

During the period under scrutiny, this basic sympathy was reflected in numerous public opinion surveys. Polls taken from June 1967 to August 1982 showed that whereas sympathy for the Arab nations did not surpass 16 percent, support for Israel fluctuated between 44 percent and 56 percent (Novik, forthcoming). Similarly, throughout the 1970s at least three out of four Americans polled held a positive image of Israel.

In this sense, the continued success of pro-Israel forces in promoting favorable policies and legislation can be attributed primarily to these persistent, widely shared positive feelings toward Israel in the American public rather than to purely organizational factors. To the extent that American Jews have been able to advance their interest in Israel, their success has depended on the sympathy or at least lack of opposition by their coalition partners and the public at large, and on the willing or reluctant disposition of the policy makers to go along with the propositions advanced by them and their supporters. Furthermore, in the absence of any convincing indicators of general Arab readiness for greater flexibility and pragmatism in the

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Arab-Israeli sphere, it is widely felt that an American course of unmitigated pressure on Israel could only encourage the Arab camp to hold to its noncompromising line (Safran 1978, p. 572).

The most effective institutional representative of this pervasive complex of beliefs, which has constituted the main resistance to repeated executive efforts to redefine the limits of coercive diplomacy toward Israel, has been the US Congress. The Symington-Javits resolution of 28 June 1967, which had 63 sponsors; the Ribicoff-Scott statement of 25 April 1969, with 68 signatories; the Case-Tydings declaration of 25 February 1970, which had 70 signatories; Senator Scott's initiative of 15 October 1971, with its 78 sponsors; and the letter to President Ford that was sent in May 1975 by 76 senators—these are but a few instances of the sort of legislative activity that reflects widespread and durable support for Israel in the Senate (Reich 1977, p. 374).

Clearly, therefore, the American posture toward Israel has not unfolded in a political, social, and psychological vacuum. In attempting to implement a strategy incorporating coercive and deterring elements, various administrations have had to cope with structural constraints—systematic and global as well as bilateral—that have not infrequently compelled them to scale down, obfuscate, or altogether abandon certain courses of action.

THE REASSESSMENT OF AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL: MARCH-SEPTEMBER 1975

The strategy of reassessment, which clouded American-Israeli relations during the spring and most of the summer of 1975, unfolded within a partially consensual context. Indeed, some of the components of the American approach essentially coincided with at least some of the short-term strategic objectives of the Rabin government in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Secretary of State Kissinger was convinced that in order to defuse the Arab-Israeli conflict, it was necessary to proceed gradually. He believed that the introduction of "comprehensive formulas" for settling the entire Middle East predicament "with a single stroke" could only harden opposing positions and thus aggravate an already tense situation. It was essential, according to this perception, to segment controversial issues into individual elements that could be negotiated separately, while obfuscating or side-stepping some of the knottiest issues (Ben-Zvi 1978, p. 115; Kissinger 1982, pp. 778–799). What Kissinger envisioned, then, was a prolonged process of mutually satisfying interactions that was bound to culminate in an overall settlement.

At the same time, at least some components of the regional outlook of Israel's policy elite were patterned closely on Kissingerian premises. Specifically, Prime Minister Rabin believed that it was necessary for Israel to postpone discussion of a comprehensive settlement until the energy shortage had been alleviated, to procrastinate on difficult issues (such as the West Bank) that were bound to create friction in American-Israeli relations, and to concentrate instead on the relatively less problematic southern front.

In addition to their shared predilection for an incremental approach, both Rabin and Kissinger wanted to see American influence in the area increased at the expense of the Soviet Union. Indeed, Rabin hoped that an agreement with Egypt would not only reduce pressures for a comprehensive settlement, but would help the United States to strengthen its regional position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and in this sense he was fully committed to one of the central tenets of Kissinger's Middle East diplomacy. (Rabin also hoped that the conclusion of an Israeli-Egyptian agreement would drive a wedge between Egypt and Syria, thus reducing the overall threat to Israel.)

However, notwithstanding that Rabin's main conceptions were virtually identical to those that Kissinger had tirelessly preached to the Israeli leaders on many occasions over the previous year, the initial American attempt to mediate an Egyptian-Israeli accord was futile, thus precipitating the reassessment strategy.

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accord negotiated by the United States, regardless of its particular provisions, as an impetus for accomplishing a wide range of both regional and global objectives, including, of course, a further improvement in American-Egyptian relations. Israel's policy elite, on the other hand, was much more cautious. Focusing narrowly on the Israeli-Egyptian dyad, it remained adamant in its demand that the agreement be "a step toward peace in some practical measure." Indeed, throughout the negotiations Israel insisted on a formal Egyptian statement proclaiming an end to the state of belligerence as a precondition for its withdrawal from the Mitla and Gidi passes. (Although Israel's policy makers were apparently willing to accept certain "functional equivalents" of nonbelligerence, these remained loose abstractions in the course of the negotiations.)

At any rate, for all his eloquence and persuasive skill, Kissinger's last-ditch effort to induce Israel to accept positions it was hitherto unwilling to endorse did not bear fruit.

The coercive drive that the United States launched in the wake of this debacle was termed "reassessment." It comprised several punitive measures, in the form of implicit threats as well as limited sanctions. Specifically, in addition to the suspension of consideration of future economic assistance, the administration "froze" Israel's request for new and sophisticated weapons such as F-15 combat aircraft, and delayed the delivery of already committed Lance surface-to-surface missiles. Concurrently, on 31 March 1975 Secretary of Defense Schlesinger announced that the United States would be "reluctant" to enter into new arms commitments with Israel as long as the reassessment policy remained in effect. He noted, however, that the delivery to Israel of substantial quantities of equipment as contracted for in previous agreements would be completed by 1 April 1975 (Sheehan 1975, p. 115; Pollock 1982, p. 187). Another element of this strategy, which "was almost entirely meant to serve the purpose of putting psychological pressure on Israel," was the deliberate dissemination of information intended to raise the specter of reconvening the Geneva Peace Conference as a possible alternative to the step-by-step approach (Safran 1978, p. 549).

In an attempt to lend credence to this threat, Kissinger summoned to Washington several leading members of the foreign policy establishment (including Dean Rusk, George Ball, David Rockefeller, William Scranton, Douglas Dillon, and Averell Harriman) for discussions on the matter. The composition of this group guaranteed a priori that the "Geneva scenario," which called for the reconvening of the Geneva forum and the concurrent formulation of an American plan for a comprehensive peace based upon Israel's 1967 borders with minor modifications, would emerge as the most favorable option (Quandt 1977, pp. 269–270).

Nevertheless, by May 1975 it had become clear to the administration that the use of purely coercive methods could not in itself induce Israel to significantly modify its bargaining position. Moreover, in pursuing its coercive posture, the administration could not remain totally oblivious to a number of domestic factors, and particularly to the predilections of the overwhelming majority of the US Senate, which ultimately severely narrowed its margin of maneuverability. The most powerful indication of domestic discontent, one that played a major role in affecting Washington's perceptions, was conveyed to the administration on 21 May 1975. Incensed by what they perceived as "too much pressure on Israel," seventy-six senators responded favorably to an AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) initiative and sent a strongly worded letter to the president urging him to be "responsive to Israel's economic and military needs" (Quandt 1977, p. 270). Maintaining that "a strong Israel constitutes a most reliable barrier to domination of the area by outside forces," the senators further insisted that "given the recent flow of Soviet weaponry to the Arab States, it is imperative that we do not permit the military balance to shift against Israel" (quoted in Sheehan 1975, p. 145). And of course, the decisive action the Senate took in May 1975 to constrain the Ford administration did not unfold in a social vacuum. Indeed, the views expressed by the Senate majority fully coincided with the findings of several public opinion surveys, which consistently reported the existence of a large and solid base of popular support for Israel in the United

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For example, a Harris poll taken in mid-April 1975—that is, a few weeks after the reassessment policy was launched—found that "a solid majority of the American people felt that the current Israeli government was reasonable and wanted to work for a peace settlement." This poll further disclosed that "a rather lopsided 66 to 24 percent majority favors sending Israel what it needs in the way of military hardware"—at a time when military assistance to foreign countries was generally opposed by most Americans. A few months later, in the summer of 1975, the Cambridge Survey asked a national sample of respondents to juxtapose between the Israelis and the Arabs in terms of their preexisting background images and found similar results (*Cambridge Report* 1975, p. 180; *Near East Report* 1975, p. 62).

In another survey from the same period, Caddell found that whereas 33 percent of those interviewed maintained that the Arab states were more responsible than Israel "for the continuing crisis in the Middle East," only 10 percent pinned the blame on Israel. In August 1975, Yankelovich found even more negative judgments of the Arabs: less than one-fifth of those interviewed (17 percent) thought the Arabs were interested in peace, while a majority, 53 percent, said that "they were out to destroy Israel" (Novik, forthcoming).

Thus it was clear that the administration lacked the necessary base of domestic support for the effective pursuit of coercive diplomacy. Ford and Kissinger were also confronted with Egypt's continued inflexible approach, and thus decided, in August 1975, to soften their stance toward Israel by incorporating significant positive inducements into their coercive strategy. Whereas the president and his powerful secretary of state had hitherto been reluctant to comprehensively compensate Israel for the unilateral concessions to Egypt it was called upon to make, they were now prepared—in the wake of the initial failure of their reassessment policy to precipitate change in the Israeli position—to offer Israel a wide assortment of incentives to abandon most of its demands regarding Egypt.

Specifically, the architects of American diplomacy now agreed to provide Israel with large-scale economic and military aid (totaling approximately $1.5 billion in military credits, plus about half as much in economic aid for the fiscal year 1975/76) as well as advanced weapons. In addition, several far-reaching guarantees of a strategic-political nature were incorporated into a US-Israeli Memorandum of Agreement that was initialed on 1 September 1975 as part of the second Sinai agreement. In accordance with this memorandum, the administration undertook to consult with Israel in the event of any threat to it from "a world power"; to supply oil to Israel "if the oil Israel needs to meet all of its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase"; to continue to maintain Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment such as the F-16 aircraft; to continue to adhere to its policy of nonrecognition of the PLO as long as it did not recognize Israel's right to exist and did not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; and "to consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy at the Geneva peace conference on this issue with the government of Israel" (Sheehan 1975, pp. 254–257; Touval 1982, p. 271).

Thus provided with the carrot of multiple incentives, Jerusalem's policy elite ultimately decided to set aside its reservations. On 1 September 1975, Israel signed the second Sinai agreement. This final accord was essentially identical to the draft Israel had rejected in March. It fell considerably short of Israel's initial expectations and was still largely asymmetrical as far as the Egyptian-Israeli dyad was concerned; the Israeli withdrawal from the Mitla and Gidi passes and from the oil fields of Abu Rudeis was not reciprocated by any explicit Egyptian commitment to terminate the state of belligerence. But it was the American compensation to Israel that provided the impetus for modifying Rabin's position. True, Rabin still hoped that, notwithstanding its shortcomings, the agreement would drive a wedge between Cairo and Damascus. But Israel's prime minister was ultimately induced to sign an agreement in which the mediator—rather than the opponent—offered the necessary compensation for Israel's territorial concessions to Egypt.

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In conclusion, it was this combination of implicit and explicit threats, together with a complex of positive inducements introduced against the backdrop of inadequate domestic support for sanctions, that led to the ultimate success of the renewed American diplomatic drive of the summer of 1975.

THE AMERICAN-SOVIET STATEMENT OF 1 OCTOBER 1977

Contrary to Ford and Kissinger's propensity to manipulate the international balance of power and thus to seek containment through negotiations (Hoffman 1983, pp. 16, 33), the Carter policymaking machine attempted to decouple superpower rivalry from local and regional issues (Gaddis 1982, pp. 282–283; Sandler 1984, p. 64). On occasion it was even disposed to solicit Soviet cooperation in the quest for stability in such volatile, conflict-ridden areas as the Middle East. Indeed, whereas Kissinger's Middle East diplomacy was practically (though not formally) designed "to expel the Soviets from the region," President Carter was prepared to deemphasize superpower competition and thus seek Soviet cooperation in jointly formulating a settlement (Spiegel 1980–81, p. 6; Hoffmann 1983, p. 63).

Convinced that long-standing tensions could be quickly alleviated through a vigorous diplomatic effort, the Carter administration believed that comprehensive peace was a viable, highly valuable policy option. Thus it embarked, in January 1977, upon a systematic diplomatic effort to quickly reconvene the Geneva forum for the purpose of negotiating multilateral peace (Vance 1983, p. 163).

The Carter presidency's notion of confronting head-on all the major controversial issues in Geneva resulted in a threefold formula for a settlement. While some of the elements in this framework (particularly those involving the need to reach a "positive peace") clearly reflected the consensual nature of the American-Israeli dyad, it was in the Palestinian sphere (as well as on the related issue of permanent boundaries) that the emergence of incompatible positions precipitated the coercive American drive of

1977.

Believing that "the Palestinians must be given a stake in peace so that they will turn away from the violence of the past and move toward a future in which they can express their legitimate political aspirations peacefully," the president and his foreign policy advisors repeatedly stressed that the Palestinian problem would have to be given priority at the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference that the new administration hoped to reconvene in 1977 (Carter 1982, pp. 273–279; Vance 1983, p. 166).

Concurrent with recommendations that "in the context of a peace settlement, the Palestinians should . . . partake fully in the benefits of peace,"[1] American decision makers launched, in the spring of 1977, a major diplomatic drive intended "to educate public opinion, step-by-step, toward an acceptance of the idea that the Palestine Liberation Organization might be an appropriate partner in negotiations which would result in the creation of a Palestine 'entity' or 'homeland'" (Cohen 1978, p. 618). Whereas the president's public statements on the subject were at first deliberately equivocal, he was much more assertive in some of his private meetings such as that held in March 1977 with Israeli prime minister Rabin (Carter 1982, p. 280). Notwithstanding this public preference for such vague and ambivalent terms as "the Palestinian people" or the Clinton formula of "a homeland . . . for the Palestinian refugees," it became increasingly clear in subsequent months that Carter's view was that the PLO had to be represented in the Geneva negotiations as soon as it accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338 (Carter 1982, p. 290).

However, this attempt proved abortive. In the first place, the PLO refused, in the summer of 1977, to endorse even that modified formulation of Resolutions 242 and 338 that the United States views as the equivalent of recognizing Israel's right to exist (Cohen 1978, p. 618). Furthermore, whether or not the administration was prepared to negotiate with the PLO, Israel still adamantly refused to accept PLO representation at Geneva in any shape or form. Israeli leaders continued to fear that any negotiations with the PLO were bound to involve the question of a Palestinian state.

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Faced with this ongoing impasse over Palestinian representation, the Carter administration decided to try a new coercive strategy designed to make Israel modify its position on this question. Thus the administration, frustrated by its inability to persuade Israel to accept the PLO at Geneva voluntarily, released the text of a joint superpower declaration on the parameters of a comprehensive Middle East peace.

The 1 October initiative was based on the assumption, articulated by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski as early as the summer of 1975, that a powerful demonstration of superpower unity was the best way to signal resolve and credibility, and was therefore bound to put effective pressure on the Israelis. It was thus expected that "a public US posture in favor of such a settlement would exert powerful influence and would probably gain both domestic and international support" (Brzezinski, Duchene, and Saeki 1975, pp. 10, 16). Israel, confronted with this *fait accompli* and with a determined and coherent American approach, would be unwilling to risk a showdown possibly leading to splendid isolation and considerable hardship, and would be forced to attend the Geneva Conference on the terms specified in the statement, namely, with the participation of representatives of the "Palestinian people" (President Carter tended to use the term "Palestinians" euphemistically, in fact referring to the PLO; Cohen 1978, p. 626).

Two years after they were originally published in *Foreign Policy*, Brzezinski's ideas concerning how to bring Israel in line became the source of official American policy toward Israel (Brzezinski 1983, p. 88). Thus a circle was closed in US policy. The stick of 1 October 1977 amounted to no less than a de facto repudiation of the carrot of September 1975, which had provided the impetus for the Sinai interim agreement. Contrary to Washington's 1975 commitment "to consult fully and to seek to concert its position and strategy at the Geneva peace conference on this issue [of Palestinian participation] with the government of Israel," the joint superpower statement of 1 October 1977 constituted a *fait accompli*, and was not preceded by any sort of bilateral consultations. Furthermore, although the United States had agreed in

1975 that the participation in Geneva "of any possible additional state, group or organization will require the agreement of all the initial participants," the new document openly called for the inclusion of representatives of "the Palestinian people" in the Geneva forum. In view of Carter's repeated references to the PLO as an organization that "represents, certainly, a substantial part of the Palestinians," there could be no doubt that the two superpowers envisaged the PLO's inclusion in a Geneva Conference that they hoped to reconvene "not later than December 1977."

But Washington's expectations that the Soviet-American declaration would eliminate the obstacles on the road to Geneva and compel Israel to face up to the "fact" that there could be no peace without the PLO, failed to materialize. As in the early phase of the 1975 reassessment posture, the pursuit in 1977 of a coercive course that was devoid of any meaningful positive inducement (and that lacked an adequate base of public support) could not bring Israel to comply. Perceiving the issue of PLO participation in the peacemaking process (implicit in the 1 October statement) as a "core" question, Israel's decision makers remained implacable in their opposition to the new initiative, regardless of the cost that such a posture could incur.

Concurrent with Israel's staunch opposition to the 1 October 1977 statement, the president and his advisors were confronted with a storm of domestic protest that—as in the case of the reassessment policy—necessitated drastic modifications in the American strategy and led to the introduction of various incentives for Israel that amounted to a tacit repudiation of several components of the declaration. Thus the US Congress reacted with defiance to the surprising initiative, with 150 congressmen expressing "grave concern" over the Soviet-American document, and over what was regarded as the unwise and unnecessary invitation to the Soviet Union to reenter the scene of Middle East peace negotiations. The Jewish community's leadership reacted equally swiftly and unequivocally (e.g., the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, headed by Rabbi Alexander Schindler, labeled the 1 October statement "an abandonment of America's historical commitment to the security and

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As in the 1975 case, these expressions of organizational defiance were but the tip of the iceberg, and accurately reflected the prevailing mood of the nation as a whole. For example, according to a Gallup poll taken in October 1977, 46 percent of those interviewed indicated support for Israel while only 11 percent expressed support for the Arabs. A number of surveys in 1977 that asked respondents to make comparative evaluations of Israel and the PLO revealed overwhelming preference for Israel. In one typical survey, whereas 88 percent felt that "we can get along" with Israel, 23 percent said the same of the PLO. On the issue of recognition, 40 percent of a sample polled by Yankelovich claimed that "Israel was doing the right thing in refusing to negotiate with the PLO," while only 21 percent said that the policy of nonrecognition was wrong (Curtis 1981, p. 93).

Thus, far from isolating Israel by mobilizing domestic and international support in favor of the joint statement, the Carter entourage found itself isolated and embattled amid a storm of protest. Consequently, as in the summer of 1975, American policy makers were quickly forced to shift gears and offer Israel compensation of such magnitude as to render obsolete most aspects of the new strategy.

Thus in a working paper signed on 5 October 1977 by Minister Dayan and Secretary Vance, it was mutually agreed that UN Resolutions 242 and 338 remained the only basis for negotiations at Geneva, and that all the initial terms of reference remained in force "except as may be agreed by the parties." Although the working paper, like the superpower declaration, called for Palestinian participation in the Geneva Conference, it explicitly reconfirmed the 1975 American position that "any new participant in Geneva must be agreed to by all the parties" (Cohen 1978, p. 624; Vance 1983, p. 195).

Not only was the administration forced, as in 1975, to offer Israel far-reaching concessions that secured its essential demands, but in nature some of these concessions or incentives (such as the pledge to agree jointly on new participants in Geneva) were identical to those offered to Israel in 1975. Ultimately, the plan for reconvening the Geneva Conference in 1977 did not materialize, and it was soon overshadowed by President Sadat's peace initiative—which itself reflected, in no small measure, Egypt's disenchantment with American diplomacy.

SHIPMENT OF F-16 AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL: JUNE-AUGUST 1981

Initially at least, the Carter presidency assigned priority to the goal of mitigating the Arab-Israeli conflict over that of competing successfully with the Soviet Union. In contrast, the Reagan foreign policy machinery concentrated on a second traditional US objective—stemming the tide of Soviet influence in the region. Indeed, whereas the Carter administration was anxious for Soviet cooperation in defining the parameters of a regional settlement (as the joint superpower statement on the Middle East of 1 October 1977 clearly indicates), President Reagan was predisposed to subordinate the search for progress toward peace to what was viewed as the more compelling need to improve the American position in the Persian Gulf. Convinced that the Soviet Union posed the greatest danger to the region, the Reagan entourage "focused overwhelmingly on a single issue and a single contingency—the threat of Soviet invasion or international aggression by Soviet-backed radical states in the Gulf" (Rubin 1983, p. 367), while downgrading the issues related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Accordingly, events such as the 7 June 1981 Israeli strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor and, even more so, the intensification of the protracted crisis in Lebanon were viewed in Washington as needless and potentially harmful distractions that could well complicate the task of consolidating a regional strategic consensus to stem Soviet inroads in the Middle East.

The Israeli air strike against the reactor, in whose wake the United States decided to suspend the shipment of four F-16 aircraft to Israel, came at a time when the administration was seeking to reestablish American credibility with Saudi Arabia and other pro-Western Arab states, and to guarantee that Riyadh continue its mediation effort in the Syrian missile crisis. In April,

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just two months before the strike, Secretary of State Alexander Haig had, during a Middle East tour, unsuccessfully tried to persuade Saudi Arabia and Jordan that the Soviet Union was the major threat to regional stability.

Similarly, the decision of 17 July 1981, following the Israeli air strike against PLO headquarters in Beirut, to extend the embargo to six additional F-16 aircraft reflected the administration's concern that this action could further aggravate an already tense situation.

In the case of the reassessment of 1975, coercive diplomacy was resorted to as a means of inducing Israel to comply with certain explicit, well-defined demands. But during the summer of 1981 no such self-evident definition of the preconditions for lifting the suspension of F-16 aircraft deliveries emerged. This ambiguity resulted from intragovernmental disagreement on the limits of coercive diplomacy toward Israel. It was reflected in muted and opaque rhetoric, which loosely linked the removal of sanctions to "sustained Israeli good behavior" and to the cessation of certain types of activity "that Israel must not resume."

It was this lack of clarity concerning the *precise* criteria for compliance that lessened the coercive impact of the initial American strategy as it unfolded in June 1981. The weaknesses of such an ambiguous coercive strategy were clearly exposed on 17 July 1981 when Israeli F-16 aircraft again launched a massive retaliatory strike—this time against PLO headquarters in Beirut. The US administration now began to more explicitly link the modus operandi it desired of Israel in Lebanon to the resumption of F-16 deliveries. Indeed, in most of their public statements US policy makers now came to argue, like Defense Secretary Weinberger, that "Israel's future behavior toward Lebanon generally, and the ceasefire particularly, will largely determine when the 10 planes are shipped" (*Washington Post*, 28 July 1981).

But even when a measure of clarity on criteria for compliance was achieved, intra-administration dissent weakened the American coercive strategy. Specifically, whereas Deputy Secretary Weinberger, Deputy Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of State William Clark, and Counselor McFarlane continuously supported a hard-line posture toward Israel with harsh and comprehensive military and economic sanctions, President Reagan and Secretary of State Haig formed a soft-line "blocking opposition" that advocated a more moderate course (*Baltimore Sun*, 12 June 1981; *Washington Post*, 17 June 1981).

During June and July 1981, these divergent approaches led to repeated intragovernmental friction. For example, in his testimony of 17 June 1981 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Counselor McFarlane harshly criticized the Israeli raid on Baghdad. In sharp contrast, President Reagan's remarks at his press conference of 16 June 1981 were full of empathy for Israel's motivations in launching its raid of 7 June. In a tone markedly different from McFarlane's, Reagan argued that Israel "had reason for concern in view of the past history of Iraq, which has never signed a ceasefire or recognized Israel as a nation" (*Washington Post*, 17 June 1981).

A similar picture of disunity emerged in the wake of Israel's 17 July air strike against PLO headquarters in Beirut, which precipitated the president's decision of 20 July to suspend the delivery to Israel of six more F-16 aircraft. In a television interview on 23 July 1981, Secretary Weinberger accused Israel of undermining US diplomatic efforts to negotiate a settlement to the Syrian missile crisis. Weinberger's posture was fully shared by Deputy Secretary Clark, who on the very same day harshly criticized Israel's prime minister (*Washington Star*, 24 July 1981).

However, as in the previous month, President Reagan adopted a more conciliatory line toward Israel. Asked in his press conference of 23 July 1981 if there were limits to his patience with the Israeli government, the president replied: "Remember this also . . . that [the Israelis] are subject to repeated rocket attacks on civilian quarters themselves. We want an end to violence on both sides" (*Washington Star*, 24 July 1981).

Viewed against this backdrop of fundamental differences in outlook, and thus in policy recommendations, between the "hard-liners" and "soft-liners" among the policy makers, the administration's coercive posture in the summer of 1981 appears as a tenuous and uneasy compromise, and as such fell considerably short of a coherent and credible strategy. In its ambivalence it failed to convey an unequivocal deterring message in the form of specific, well-defined trade-offs between the desired Israeli action and the American response.

In addition to this failure to specify the terms, the initial coercive attempt of June 1981 was further weakened by inadequate domestic support. Public opinion surveys clearly indicated an "initial qualified approval of the June 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq's Osiraq nuclear facility, [which] was translated into a 3:1 opposition to punishing Israel for having taken that action" (Novik, forthcoming). Similarly, congressional reaction to the raid was generally restrained, with some indications of support and sympathy. Although several senators did criticize the Israeli action, "sentiment [in Congress] in favor of punitive action has appeared . . . weak" (*Washington Star*, 11 June 1981).

With the July crisis, however, the reaction was quite different. Indeed, the Israeli attack on the PLO in Beirut precipitated an unprecedented public demand for limited military sanctions against Israel. Outrage over the reported civilian casualties was manifested in a number of public opinion surveys that indicated growing support for US pressure on Israel. For example, a Gallup poll in late July 1981 found that 50 percent of the respondents expressed disapproval of the raid, compared to 31 percent who supported it. The poll also found that 61 percent opposed the resumption of F-16 aircraft deliveries to Israel, whereas only 30 percent favored delivery. Similar findings were reported by a concurrent Associated Press-NBC News poll (*Chicago Sun-Times*, 21 August 1981).

Congressional reaction to the July raid was equally harsh. Not only did a number of traditional supporters of Israel on Capitol Hill—including Senators Biden, Kassenbaum, and Boschwitz—condemn the raid (and commend Reagan's 20 July decision to suspend delivery of the F-16 aircraft), but some of Israel's most ardent congressional allies "were conspicuous in their failure either to defend Israel's actions or to criticize the administration" (*Congressional Quarterly*, 21 July 1981, p. 1351).

Nevertheless, the Reagan administration's stance during the July 1981 crisis did not have a lasting impact on American-Israeli relations. Not only was it charged with confusion and ambiguity, but it was officially terminated on 17 August 1981 without conveying any long-term and credible message of restraint—except, of course, for the need to observe the cease-fire agreement. Thus, within weeks of the conclusion of the Lebanon cease-fire, Secretary Haig declared that the calmer "overall situation" in the area permitted scheduled deliveries of aircraft to Israel to resume.

THE LIMITS OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY IN THE LEBANON WAR

American diplomacy during and in the aftermath of the Lebanon War that erupted in June 1982 can be seen as an extension and intensification of the Reagan administration's coercive posture toward Israel during the summer of 1981.

Initially, the administration's response reflected the essentially consensual nature of the American-Israeli dyad in general, and in particular the convergence of certain regional strategic interests. During the early stages of the war, President Reagan and his foreign policy advisors reacted with marked complacency to the destruction of the PLO infrastructure in Southern Lebanon and Beirut. Thus they tacitly supported what initially appeared to be a severe blow to the PLO and to Syrian and Soviet interests. And they believed the war could well provide the impetus for a wide range of highly desirable outcomes including the establishment of a stable government in Lebanon, the withdrawal of all foreign forces from that country, and the weakening of the PLO's grip on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Haig 1984, pp. 317–318).

However, it soon became evident that an ever-widening gap in policies and goals was forming between the United States and Israel, thus converting a relatively consensual dyad into a considerably more conflictual one.

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Fearing that the expansion of the Lebanon conflict (and continued tacit endorsement of the Israeli strategy) might seriously jeopardize American relations with such regional powers as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, they were further enraged by what were perceived in Washington as deceptive Israeli reassurances regarding the scope of the war.

American-Israeli relations were further clouded in September 1982 following the release of the Reagan Plan, which was based on the notion that "self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace." It had been assumed that rapid progress in the negotiations toward a political settlement in Lebanon, incorporating an immediate Israeli withdrawal, was the key to enhancing American credibility and inducing the vacillating King Hussein (whose bargaining position vis-à-vis the PLO and Syria was presumed to have been strengthened following the war) to lend his full support to the Reagan Plan (Hussein having insisted that one of his preconditions for endorsing the American plan was an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon). But Israel, which rejected the plan outright, sought to procrastinate on the issue of a Lebanon settlement as a means of torpedoing the entire Reagan design. In other words, the Reagan policy elite embarked, in September 1982, on a strategy that was based on the notion that the two issues of Lebanon and a Palestinian solution were inextricably linked, and that progress in the wider Palestinian area was therefore contingent upon a rapid settlement in Lebanon. Israel, in contrast, based its policy on a reverse notion of linkage, and sought to deflect and in fact remove the sting of the Reagan Plan by disrupting the American timetable in Lebanon.

It was only in April 1983 that this "linkage posture" was significantly modified. King Hussein's decision not to enter the peacemaking process on the basis of Reagan's 1 September plan (which was precipitated by the PLO's refusal to grant him a mandate to negotiate) in effect sealed the fate of the Reagan initiative, at least in the short term, and rendered irrelevant the entire notion of a built-in linkage between the two policy frameworks. This provided Israel with the needed incentive to reach agreement with Lebanon and indeed paved the way toward the conclusion of the ill-fated May 1983 Israeli-Lebanese agreement.

In analyzing American policy as it unfolded from the summer of 1982 to the spring of 1983, it is clear that in the period immediately after the outbreak of the war, this posture was closely patterned on the principle of incrementalism. The Reagan administration was aware that it lacked adequate domestic support for a maximalistic, undisguised coercive drive. Therefore, it resorted to an essentially low-key strategy that sought to combine the stick of selective punishment with the carrot of continued supply in most categories of military assistance.

This cautious and phased approach began with the presidential decision of early June 1982 to postpone formal notification to Congress of the sale of seventy-five F-16 aircraft to Israel (which were scheduled for delivery in 1985). Although an informal notification of the plane sale had been sent to Congress on 26 May 1982, the administration—what with the outbreak of the war and the extensive use by Israel of F-16 aircraft—decided not to follow the common practice of announcing the sale formally within twenty days of the informal notification.

A second punitive measure was announced soon after. This was the administration's decision of 19 July 1982 to suspend the scheduled transfer to Israel of four thousand 155-mm shells of the "cluster-bomb" category. The mounting political debate in the United States over the possible misuse of these highly devastating weapons by Israel in Lebanon contributed to this "suspension order."[2] The administration, however, was careful not to interrupt the flow to Israel of other kinds of military equipment and spare parts in accordance with preexisting contracts (including the shipment of eleven F-16 aircraft). Thus the Reagan administration limited its actual punitive measures to certain selective categories of weapons that were particularly vulnerable to criticism, while accompanying these actions with both the stick of warning about additional punishment and the carrot of continued flow of other military equipment, as well as continued political support in such international organizations as the United Nations.

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The second, and more assertive, phase of the administration's coercive strategy began in September 1982, following Israel's entrance into West Beirut and the killings by the Phalangists at Sabra and Shatila. Now the administration gradually moved to intensify and diversify the pressure, combining actual punishment with the implicit threat of additional sanctions unless Israel decided to acquiesce. When taken in isolation, most of the components of the American coercive strategy in the fall and winter of 1982 appear neither dramatic nor far-reaching; taken together, however, they were considerably more weighty.

For example, in September 1982 the administration began to procrastinate on Israel's requests for vital technological transfers needed for the development of its advanced combat aircraft, the Lavi. Early that same month Washington similarly adopted a policy of "licensing delay" whereby such American firms as Pratt and Whitney were prevented from transferring to Israel "composite materials technology" (namely, the know-how for making the aircraft shell from lightweight fiberglass and plastics instead of metal). Concurrently, the administration delayed a scheduled visit to the United States of an Israeli mission to discuss various facets of the Lavi project, and remained noncommittal toward Israel's request to use some of the annual US military sales credits for purchases within Israel itself (*Ha'aretz*, 6 October 1982). Thus these punitive measures, while seemingly low-key and unobtrusive, together constituted a coherent, escalating coercive drive.

Moreover, when the issue of economic aid to Israel was put before the Congress, the administration did resort to more assertive tactics. Thus in a 1 December 1982 letter from Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Dam to Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Mark Hatfield, Dam strongly opposed a congressional initiative to increase military and economic aid to Israel. Dam argued that were Congress to be more generous than the White House wished it to be in providing aid to Israel in the wake of war—and at a time when the president's peace plan remained stalled—this "could imperil the strenuous effort we are making to find a settlement in Lebanon and to make progress in the broader peace process," and would therefore "sharply increase the difficulty of drawing into the larger peace process those whose participation is essential to progress by appearing to endorse and reward Israel's policies." Dam's letter capped a concerted effort by the administration to convince Congress that, in Secretary Shultz's words, "added aid to Israel would come at the wrong time from the standpoint of the President [, who was] trying to promote the peace process" (*Washington Post*, 25 December 1982).

This was the first time the administration explicitly linked aid levels to Israel's specific policies—and the attempt proved abortive. Indeed, for all their intensive efforts, administration officials could not persuade Congress to use economic punishment against Israel. Over Senator Hatfield's objections, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved the funding level recommended by the Kasten Appropriations Subcommittee, which not only surpassed the president's aid request by $475 million but also involved a more favorable military aid program. The full Senate followed suit on 16 December 1982, with a 57–41 margin.

Thus toward the end of 1982 it became evident that neither repeated congressional criticism of some of Israel's actions in Lebanon nor harsh economic realities could affect the legislators' determination to increase aid to Israel. In this respect, although the Lebanon War had accelerated an erosion in public and congressional support for some of Israel's actions, this had not yet affected what are still widely perceived as "legitimate Israeli economic and military needs and requirements" (Novik, forthcoming).

Not until May 1983 did the crisis in American-Israeli relations largely subside with the conclusion of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement. While falling considerably short of many of Israel's initial expectations, this accord paved the way toward the release of the embargoed F-16 aircraft to Israel and was accompanied by additional American incentives sufficient to overcome Israel's disinclination to sign the agreement. Clearly, however, Israel was also encouraged by Jordan's refusal to endorse the Reagan Plan as a basis for negotiations, since this meant that the accord with Lebanon was unlikely to lead to additional pressures for progress on the Palestinian front.

As for US public opinion in this period, it is clear that at least during the early phases of the war a majority of the American public supported Israel's military involvement in Lebanon. For example, in a nationwide survey by the *Los Angeles Times* in early July 1982, 50 percent said that "their sympathies were more with the Israelis than the Arabs," with 18 percent saying their sympathies were more with the Arabs. Furthermore, 46 percent maintained that the Israeli army "should finish the job of pushing the PLO out of Lebanon," whereas 24 percent disagreed. When asked whether they thought the Israeli army should or should not "stay in Lebanon until a strong central government is established there," 47 percent answered affirmatively, 21 percent negatively (*Los Angeles Times*, 11 July 1982).

One month later, in a Harris survey conducted from 5 to 10 August, a similar picture emerged. Thus 59 percent indicated that they sided with Israel, while only 15 percent favored the PLO (in August 1981, the division was 59 percent to 14 percent in favor of Israel). And a Washington Post-ABC News poll that same month found that 52 percent of the respondents sympathized with Israel and 18 percent with the Arab side; the Gallup Organization came up with similar results (*International Herald Tribune*, 24 August 1982; *B'nai B'rith Messenger*, 20 August 1982).

Not until September 1982 was this basic support for Israel significantly modified. The cumulative impact of the continued bombing of West Beirut on the one hand and the killings in the Sabra and Shatila camps on the other brought about a significant, albeit temporary, change in public opinion toward Israel, thus setting the stage for the administration's November 1982 attempt to prevent an increase in economic aid to Israel. Specifically, according to a Washington Post-ABC News poll taken late in September, only 40 percent of the respondents said that Israel was a reliable ally while 45 percent said it was not (in a similar survey in October 1981, 64 percent had said Israel was a reliable ally while only 24 percent denied this; and in March 1982, the figures were 54 percent to 35 percent). Furthermore, 59 percent of those interviewed in September 1982 agreed that "the US should stop supplying Israel with military arms," whereas only 35 percent disagreed.

Similar indications of erosion turned up in a *Newsweek* poll that was conducted by the Gallup Organization on 22 and 23 September.

Despite all this, Congress, although increasingly critical of various aspects of the war, still refused, as 1982 approached its end, to cross the Rubicon and lend unmitigated support to a coercive drive that might affect certain perceived legitimate security needs of Israel.

CONCLUSION

We have sought to show that from 1975 to 1983, different American administrations found it exceedingly difficult to break away from certain well-defined limits on their ability to pursue a coercive policy toward Israel.

In 1975, Ford and Kissinger completely failed in their attempted strategy of *pure* coercion toward Israel, and were ultimately compelled to offer it a wide range of political, economic, and military compensations in return for the unilateral concessions it was called upon to make in Sinai in view of Egypt's refusal to compromise. Indeed, it was only because of these planned compensations that the tension in American-Israeli relations finally receded with the conclusion, on 1 September 1975, of the second Sinai agreement (Touval 1982, p. 166). In other words, any such strategy of pure coercion was doomed to ineffectiveness (even if implemented incrementally) so long as it was "unaccompanied by any attempt at conciliation over outstanding issues" (Laurd 1967, p. 188).

Two years later, the Carter entourage was equally unsuccessful in its drive to force Israel to significantly revise its longstanding policy in the Palestinian sphere. Whereas the American coercive drive of 1975 was predicated on incrementalism and gradualism, President Carter's 1977 Middle East initiative approximated the strong variant of coercive diplomacy (George, Hall, and Simons 1971, p. 17). Although the joint superpower declaration of 1 October 1977 was not a formal, explicit ultimatum, it nonetheless incorporated both a demand that Israel modify its Palestinian policy and a threat of punishment for noncompliance, which was implicit in the structure of the situation. Yet the 1 October initiative was also doomed to failure because Israel proved the more resolute party in its unwavering opposition to PLO involvement (either explicit or even in a disguised form) in the diplomatic process. Indeed, the fact that such possible PLO participation had long been perceived in Jerusalem as an acute threat to vital security interests made Israel so adamant as to overshadow any threatened punishment. The disutility of the demanded action (a de facto recognition of the PLO) far exceeded, in Israel's eyes, the disutility of the threatened action, and thus the latter could not erode its motivation to cling to its initial position of total refusal to negotiate with the PLO (George, Hall, and Simons 1971, p. 27). Given this asymmetry in motivation favoring Israel, the American coercive drive was probably predestined to fail, even had it been able to engender sufficient domestic support.

Similarly, the coercive posture adopted by the Reagan administration in the summer of 1981 was full of ambivalence and as such fell considerably short of either of the two variants of coercive diplomacy.

While some of the coercive measures the Reagan policy elite adopted in 1982 did occasionally influence Israel's actions during the Lebanon War, they were largely ineffective on the strategic level, having failed to force Jerusalem either to enter into an early agreement with Lebanon or to soften its opposition to the Reagan Plan. Indeed, Israeli policy makers were so implacable in their opposition to this plan that they were prepared to sustain a high political cost in the face of mounting pressure.

Although, as we have seen, the preconditions for an effective coercive diplomacy (namely, an asymmetry in motivation favoring the coercing party, as well as a solid base of support for such a policy or a consensus regarding the policy's merits within the decision-making machine of the coercing party) never fully materialized during this period, the Lebanon War—in that it further eroded Israel's traditional broad base of support in American public opinion—accelerated several converging processes that can potentially change the entire structure of the American-Israeli dyad.

Although public and congressional criticism cannot always be automatically converted into a broad-based coercive drive (as the case of the Lebanon War clearly shows), these indicators of dissatisfaction along with the growing propensity to support certain ad hoc punitive steps against Israel could, if reinforced by related developments and sustained over time, have far-reaching ramifications. If we add the growing fragmentation and potential decline of the American Jewish community as a cohesive supporting bloc for Israel's policies (the war in Lebanon and the Reagan Plan proved deeply divisive for the Jewish community), as well as Israel's troubled economy and continued dependence on American aid, it appears that Washington's ability to pursue coercive diplomacy may well increase. For instance, it cannot be ruled out that Washington would, in an era of dramatic reductions in foreign aid allocations, decide to link such aid to certain political preconditions.

However, even if the administration achieves adequate domestic support for coercive diplomacy toward Israel, this can by no means guarantee in itself that the coercive tactics will be effective. A wide infrastructure of support, or at least of tacit acquiescence, is one of the necessary conditions for coercive diplomacy to succeed, but it is not a sufficient condition. Israel might still fiercely resist such pressure, and if it proves more motivated than the United States it could ultimately win the confrontation. This is the more likely if the coercive threat pertains to a core value involving vital interests or narrowly defined national security goals (Jervis 1982–83, p. 8). Thus, for example, Israel's disinclination to comply with any demand on such longstanding matters as recognition of the PLO, or the establishment of a Palestinian state, will not be eroded by the threat of severe punishment. As Craig and George cogently observe, the coercing power "must consider the question of its own and its opponent's national interests in order to calculate the utility of the various policy options" (1983, p. 181).

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It remains to be seen whether this confrontational scenario will eventually emerge. By the same token, it is not at all certain whether, and when, the regional preconditions for an effective coercive strategy—such as Arab readiness to conclude peace with Israel and the abatement of superpower rivalry in the Middle East—will materialize sufficiently to increase American maneuverability in implementing such a policy.

NOTES

1. Address of Vice President Mondale before the World Affairs Council of Northern California at San Francisco on 17 June 1977. *Department of State Bulletin* 77 (July 1977), p. 451.

2. The agreements reached between the United States and Israel in 1976 and 1978 reportedly allow the use of cluster bombs only against "regular forces of a sovereign nation" and under "special wartime conditions" (*Washington Post*, 28 July 1982; *Sunday Telegraph*, 18 July 1982; *Baltimore Sun*, 28 July 1982.)

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